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imals (Logue 1988). Behavioral ecologists investigate
rate maximization to elucidate the role of evolutionary
pressures influencing animal foraging ecology (Kacelnik
2003). These three perspectives converge in their finding
that the speed with which individuals devalue delayed
rewards (the “discounting level”) can vary tremendously between species, between individuals, across the
lifetime of a single individual, and even in different contexts for the same individual. Why does this variation
exist? Researchers suggest that some of this variation
could result from differences in the rate of interruptions
(Sozou 1998) or general cognitive ability (Tobin et al.
1996). Understanding the source of this variation could
help elucidate the causes of impulsivity and self-control.
Here, we examine discounting behavior in two cooperatively breeding New World monkeys—common marmosets and cotton-top tamarins. These species have comparable body and brain size, behavior,
mating systems and life history trajectories (Table 1).
Given the similarities and relatively close phylogenetic
relationship between these species, one might not expect substantial differences in cognitive abilities such
as discounting. A closer look at their foraging ecology,
however, reveals one factor that might favor different
discounting functions: in general, marmosets are significantly more gummivorous when compared with tamarins (approximately 70% versus 14% of feeding time, respectively; Snowdon & Soini 1988; Stevenson & Rylands
1988), whereas tamarins are more insectivorous. Gummivory requires scratching tree bark and then waiting
for the sap to flow, while insectivory favors immediate
acquisition of an ephemeral food source.
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Abstract
Decision making often involves choosing between small, short-term
rewards and large, long-term rewards. All animals, humans included,
discount future rewards—the present value of delayed rewards is
viewed as less than the value of immediate rewards. Despite its ubiquity, there exists considerable but unexplained variation between
species in their capacity to wait for rewards—that is, to exert patience or self-control. Using two closely related primates—common
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) and cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)—we uncover a variable that may explain differences in how
species discount future rewards. Both species faced a self-control
paradigm in which individuals chose between taking an immediate
small reward and waiting a variable amount of time for a large reward. Under these conditions, marmosets waited significantly longer
for food than tamarins. This difference cannot be explained by life
history, social behavior or brain size. It can, however, be explained
by feeding ecology: marmosets rely on gum, a food product acquired
by waiting for exudate to flow from trees, whereas tamarins feed
on insects, a food product requiring impulsive action. Foraging ecology, therefore, may provide a selective pressure for the evolution of
self-control.

2. Material and Methods

To evaluate the discounting behavior of both species, we used an
adjusting-delay, self-control procedure (Mazur 1987). Captive-born
subjects, with no foraging-relevant experience, chose between two
tools, one containing a small, immediate reward and the other containing a large, delayed reward (figure 1). We presented each subject
with a series of 15–32 experimental sessions composed of 10 choice
trials. In each trial, a subject selected between two options, the “standard” option of two food pellets with no delay and the “adjusting”
option of six food pellets with variable delay. Initially, there was no
delay between pulling either tool and receiving access to the food. If
the subject preferred the larger reward, we incremented the delay to
the large reward by 1 s on the subsequent session. If the subject preferred the small reward, we decreased the delay to the large reward
by 1 s. If the subject selected the two amounts equally often, the delay
to the large reward remained the same. Using this method, we titrated
the delay time to find each subject’s indifference point—the point at
which subjects equally valued the smaller, immediate reward and
larger, delayed reward (see Supplementary Materials).

Keywords: temporal discounting, impulsivity, rate maximization,
tamarins, marmosets

1. Introduction
How individuals discount or devalue future rewards
has intrigued economists, psychologists and behavioral
ecologists under a number of different guises. Researchers studying temporal discounting often have subjects
choose between small, immediate and large, delayed
rewards to assess whether they can exhibit self-control
by waiting for the delayed reward, or whether they discount the value of the delayed reward and select the immediate reward. Economists have examined discounting as a crucial factor in constructing models of how
humans assign utility to rewards available over different time-scales (Frederick et al. 2002). Psychologists
commonly use self-control paradigms to investigate the
cognitive mechanisms associated with delayed gratification and impulsivity in humans and non-human an-

3. Results
On average, tamarins showed indifference between
the amounts when the six pellets were delayed for a
mean (± s.e.) of 7.9 ± 0.6 s, whereas marmosets waited
14.4 ± 1.5 s (Figure 2), a significantly longer delay (F1,7
= 13.51, p < 0.01). The indifference points for individual tamarins ranged from 5.6 to 9.8 s, and for marmosets from 10.0 to 19.0 s; the most self-controlled tamarin
waited less than the most impulsive marmoset. We next
turn to an analysis of why such species differences may
have evolved.
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Table 1. Comparison of traits for tamarins and marmosets.
Cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Trait
weighta

body
brain weighta
brain/body weight ratioa
lifespanc
home range sized
habitatd
group sized
mating systemd
parental cared
cooperative breedingd
twinningd
dietd
percentage time feeding on gumd

gb

380
10 g
0.026
11.7 yrs
7.8–10 ha
lower to mid-canopy of Colombian rainforest
2–13
monogamy, occasional polyandry
bi-parental care
yes
common
insects > fruit > gum
14%e

Common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus)
280 gb
7.6 g
0.027
13.5 yrs
0.5–5 ha
lower to mid-canopy of Brazilian rainforest
3–13
monogamy
bi-parental care
yes
common
gum > insects > fruit
70%

a. Stephan et al. (1981).
b. Note that these values are estimates from Stephan et al. (1981) to correlate with their measures of brain size. Weights for our subjects can
be found in the Supplementary Material.
c. Ross (1991).
d. Snowdon & Soini (1988) and Stevenson & Rylands (1988).
e. No data available for Saguinus oedipus, therefore we used a measurement for closely related Saguinus geoffreyi.

Body condition (body weight/tibia length) did not
significantly correlate with indifference points for either
marmosets (r 2 = 0.33, p = 0.31) or tamarins (r 2 = 0.01, p
= 0.89), excluding the influence of motivational state on
choice behavior. Some researchers suggest that the level
of discounting may decrease with the ratio of brain size
to body weight (Tobin et al. 1996). This explanation cannot account for our differences in discounting, as the
brain : body ratio of tamarins (0.026) is almost identical
to that of marmosets (0.027; Stephan et al. 1981).
To quantitatively assess how the marmosets and tamarins devalue rewards over time, we tested whether the
patterns of discounting fit predictions made by the rate
maximization model of discounting. Rate maximization
theory predicts that foragers optimize the gain in reward per unit time (Stephens & Krebs 1986); therefore,
individuals should maximize the fitness value (V) of a
choice V = A/(t+h), where A is the reward amount, t is
the delay to reward following choice and h is the time
required to process/handle the reward. Note that this
function describes only short-term gain, omitting the
time between choices. Despite its intuitive appeal, psychologists and behavioral ecologists have demonstrated
that animals tend to ignore the inter-choice interval,
maximizing intake over the short-term rather than the
long-term (Bateson & Kacelnik 1996; Stephens & Anderson 2001). Rate maximization predicts indifference between the small and large rewards in our design when
intake rate of the standard option equals that of the adjusting option: As/(ts+hs) = Aa/(ta+ha). Given the values from Table 2, we can estimate the predicted indifference point (ta) if the subjects maximize intake rate.
Because of differences in handling time between species, rate maximization predicts an indifference point
of 8.6 s for tamarins and 6.6 s for marmosets (table 2).
While the marmosets waited longer than expected by
the rate maximization model (t8 = 4.5, p < 0.01), the tamarins’ mean indifference point did not differ from the
rate maximization prediction (t10 = −0.1, p = 0.91). Thus,

the tamarins appear to maximize their short-term intake
rate, whereas the marmosets have a longer time horizon, resulting in more self-controlled choices.
4. Discussion
The striking difference in discounting behavior between tamarins and marmosets is surprising given their
close phylogenetic relationship and comparable biology.
The two species share similar mating systems, group
sizes, cooperative behaviors and general ecology (Table
1). We suggest that a key difference between these species—their feeding ecology—may explain this difference.
Relative to other factors, ecological differences between species have been little explored as a selective
pressure on discounting. As noted, one significant ecological difference between marmosets and tamarins is
their diet. Although both species feed on fruit, marmosets specialize on plant exudates whereas tamarins focus more on insects (Coimbra-Filho & Mittermeier 1976;
Snowdon & Soini 1988; Stevenson & Rylands 1988).
Feeding on insects may require greater impulsivity to
take advantage of ephemeral bouts of availability. Foraging on exudates has led to a number of specialized
adaptations in marmosets such as modified teeth for
gouging and modified digestive physiology (Coimbra-Filho & Mittermeier 1976; Harrison & Tardif 1994;
Power & Oftedal 1996). Harrison & Tardif (1994) also
contend that the concentrated nature of gum-exuding
feeding sites may reduce gummivore home range sizes,
possibly accounting for the differences between tamarins and marmosets. We contend that gummivory may
have led to cognitive specializations as well. Because
feeding on exudates requires waiting for gum and sap
to ooze out of the plants, marmosets may have evolved
the ability to value future rewards more than the insectivorous tamarins. Therefore, the self-control needed to
feed on gums may have selected for a more general ability to delay gratification. The question remains: did selection increase impulsivity in tamarins, decrease it in
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Table 2. Summary of amounts, delays and indifference points.

standard amount (As)
adjusting amount (Aa)
standard delay (ts)a
standard handling time (hs)a
adjusted handling time (ha)a
predicted indifference point
(ta)—rate maximizationa
observed mean indifference
point

cotton-top
tamarins
(Saguinus
oedipus)

common
marmosets
(Callithrix
jacchus)

2 pellets
6 pellets
0.1 s
10.7 s
27.1 s
8.6 s

2 pellets
6 pellets
0.1 s
8.3 s
18.5 s
6.6 s

7.9 s

14.4 s

a. See Supplementary Material for calculations of these estimates.

Figure 1. Experimental apparatus for discounting procedure. Both
marmosets and tamarins experience the same choices: pulling one
of two tools. One tool yielded two food pellets after no delay, and
the other tool yielded six food pellets after a longer delay. Transparent Plexiglas covers prevented access to the pellets until the delay
expired.

Figure 2. Species differences in discounting levels. Marmosets and
tamarins differed in their indifference points with marmosets waiting almost twice as long for the six pellets than tamarins. The tamarin indifference point does not differ from that expected, but marmosets exhibit more self-control than predicted by short-term rate
maximization. Error bars represent standard error of the mean indifference points.

marmosets, or both? Given our finding that tamarins’
feeding rate maximizes but marmosets are more selfcontrolled than expected, it appears as though selection
probably favored self-control in the marmosets.
The role of feeding ecology in cognition has been documented in other species. Species that cache food have
better spatial memory (Balda & Kamil 1989) and larger

hippocampal volume (Basil et al. 1996) than closely related non-caching species. In addition, fruit-eating primates, such as spider monkeys, have larger brains than
leaf-eating species such as howler monkeys, presumably to track spatial and temporal variation in fruit distribution (Milton 1981). The present study, however,
provides the first indication that diet may influence animal discounting levels. If this model generalizes beyond
the current findings, animals with long food processing
times would exhibit more self-control than those with
short processing times (but traveling time should not affect discounting). Therefore, we predict that species that
must wait for food sources (e.g. gummivores, stalking
predators) should have longer time horizons and lower
discounting levels than species which immediately consume ephemeral food sources (e.g. frugivores, opportunistic predators); these ecological pressures may be so
fundamental that even under captive conditions, innate
species-specific differences are nonetheless maintained.
While highlighting differences in discounting levels between marmosets and tamarins in the context of
foraging, our data do not necessarily imply a difference
across all situations. In fact, selection may act on discounting levels in different contexts independently. For
example, although tamarins and marmosets value food
differently over time, they may value reproductive opportunities equally, given their similar mating systems.
Yet, in more promiscuous systems in which each reproductive attempt is more valuable, individuals may act
more impulsively in their mating decisions. Wilson &
Daly (2004) provide data illustrating how discounting
might interact with reproduction in humans by demonstrating that men discount monetary rewards more
highly following the presentation of attractive female
faces, but not unattractive faces. They conclude that the
possibility of mating makes men more impulsive. Studies that correlate discounting levels across contexts are
needed to determine the domain specificity of these cognitive adaptations.
One alternative explanation of our findings is that
rather than having different discounting levels, tamarins and marmosets value the food differently—that is,
perhaps marmosets value six pellets as more than three
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times the value of two pellets and, therefore, will wait
longer for them. While difficult to rule out, this alternative seems unlikely given that motivational measures
which would temporarily influence value (such as body
condition) did not correlate with individual indifference
points. What remains are inherent differences in value
functions between species, which are notoriously difficult to describe. Further work on varying quantities and
qualities of food, as well as different methods of delaying access to food, is needed to disentangle the complex interaction between inherent value and temporal
discounting.
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Supporting Material
Material and Methods
Subjects
We used six adult cotton-top tamarins (three males and three females) and five adult common
marmosets (three males and two females) as subjects in this experiment (See Table S.1 for
more information). All subjects participated in other behavioural experiments. One month
before this experiment, we tested four of the six tamarin subjects (DW, JK, SP, and UB) in a
pilot experiment in which they chose between an immediate two pellets or six pellets delayed
15, 20, 25, or 30 sec. There were no statistically significant differences in indifference points
for naïve or experienced subjects (F1,4 = 0.28, p = 0.63), although the sample size is
admittedly small. Nevertheless, the two naïve tamarins showed indifference at levels within
the range of the experienced individuals (Table S.1). All marmosets were naïve to the
experiment to the self-control paradigm.

The subjects received their daily food allotments after the experiments were completed at the
end of the day. Both tamarins and marmosets were maintained at body weights which
provided the most reliable performance in food-motivated tasks.

Apparatus
We placed subjects in a metal cage (30×30×30 cm) adjacent to the discounting apparatus.
There were four holes in the clear Plexiglas front panel of the cage. By reaching through the
lower two holes in the wall, subjects could grasp one of two tool handles to bring the food
reward within reach through the upper two holes (Figure 1). Transparent covers prevented
subjects from accessing the food until the end of a delay. Two solenoids operated the
movement of the covers to reveal and cover the food rewards. An experimenter flipped a
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switch, starting the electronic timer and, after a specified delay, activated the solenoids to
open the covers. A buzzer sounded during the delay period.

Trial procedures
A trial started with the presentation of two L-shaped tools to the subject through the lower
holes in the front barrier. The tools consisted of a straight handle and a crossbar trough
containing food pellets (Research Diet 45 mg banana-flavoured purified diet primate pellets).
A green tool was always associated with the delivery of six pellets, whereas an orange tool
always delivered two pellets. Within a session the tools remained on the same side of the
apparatus, but they alternated sides between sessions. To choose one of the reward options,
the subject had five seconds to touch one of the tools and 30 seconds to pull the tool until the
trough contacted the front of the Plexiglas barrier of the transport cage. Minimal effort was
required to pull both of the tools. Once the subjects touched one of the tools, the other was
immediately removed, preventing them from switching between tools. As soon as the trough
was pulled forward enough to contact the barrier, the experimenter started the delay by
activating the timer. At the end of the delay, the solenoids moved the covers, allowing the
subject to reach their reward. After retrieving the last pellets from the trough, the
experimenter started a 30 second inter-trial interval.

Each session consisted of 14 trials and lasted approximately 15 minutes. Four of the 14 trials
were forced trials; the other 10 were free choice trials. In forced trials we only presented one
tool to the subject, with the other tool remaining in sight but out of reach. A session always
started with two forced trials: one forced the larger reward and one forced the smaller. We
alternated the order of this presentation between sessions. We randomly interspersed the
remaining two forced trials (one of each choice) throughout the session. The other ten trials
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were free choice trials which allowed subjects to choose between rewards by pulling one of
the two tools.

Experimental design
Throughout the experiment, subjects received access to the small reward immediately
(standard option). The delay for the large reward (adjusting option) was constant within a
session but varied between sessions. In the first session, it started at zero and increased by
one second for the next session if the subject chose the larger of the rewards seven or more
times. Similarly, if the subject picked the smaller reward seven or more times, the adjusting
delay decreased by one second in the following session. If the subject chose neither tool
seven or more times, the delay remained the same for the next session. By adjusting the
delay, we were able to find the point at which the subjects were indifferent between the
smaller, immediate option and the larger, delayed option. We calculated this indifference
point by comparing the mean delay to large for the last five completed sessions with the mean
of the previous five sessions. Subjects reached indifference when the mean delay of the last
five sessions did not differ from the mean delay of the preceding five sessions by more than
10% or one second, whichever was larger. We used the mean delay of the last five sessions
as our estimate for the indifference point.

Calculating delays, handling times, and indifference points
Standard delay time (ts) was the estimated time between toggling switch and food becoming
available (0.1 sec). Handling times (hs and ha) were estimated from measurements of the
time between the first and last reach for pellets in six forced short-delay trials and six forced
long-delay trials for each subject. Each species’ predicted indifference points (ta) are a mean
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of individual subject predicted indifference points. That is, we applied the rate maximization
equation to each subject rather than to the overall species means. If predicted indifference
points were negative for a subject, we used a time of zero sec. This accounts for the
discrepancy between the stated predicted indifference point for tamarins (ta=8.6 sec) and that
calculated using the overall species means.

This experiment was conducted in compliance with the Harvard University Animal Care
protocols 92-16 and 22-07.

Results
Sex differences
Although sample sizes are small, there are no sex differences in indifference point (F1,7 =
0.06, p = 0.81) and there is no interaction between species and sex (F1,7 = 0.01, p = 0.91).

Motivation
To further assess the role of motivation in this experiment, we examined the subjects’
performance in trials within a session. We measured the proportion of choices for the
larger/delayed reward (arc-sine, square-root transformed) in the last 10 sessions for each
subject (the sessions used to assess the indifference point). We then divided the trials into
those which occurred in the first half of the session (trials 1-5) or the second half (trials 6-10).
There was a strong effect of trial (F1,97 = 6.49, p = 0.01)—subjects chose the larger/delayed
reward more in the first five trials. Significantly, there was no species effect or species by
trial interaction (Figure S.1). Therefore, motivation changed within a session but was the
same for both species, suggesting that their general motivational levels were roughly equal.
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Table S.1: Subject data for weights, handling times, and indifference points

Subject

Species

Sex

Standard

Adjusted

Observed

handling

handling

indifference

Weight (g)

time (sec)

time (sec)

point (sec)

AG

Tamarin

M

413

18.3

16.5

7.6

DW

Tamarin

M

322

6.7

23.8

8.4

JG

Tamarin

F

431

11.2

21.2

9.2

JK

Tamarin

F

376

4.8

15.8

5.6

SP

Tamarin

M

435

9

39

6.7

UB

Tamarin

F

404

14.2

46

9.8

Mean

Tamarin

397

10.7

27.1

7.9

Ant

Marmoset

M

254

8.7

18

10

Des

Marmoset

F

340

10

21.8

16.2

Jul

Marmoset

F

394

6.2

13.8

12.8

Oth

Marmoset

M

294

8.8

20.3

13.8

Rom

Marmoset

M

335

7.7

18.5

19

Mean

Marmoset

324

8.3

18.5

14.4
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0.70
Marmosets
Tamarins

Proportion choosing
larger/delayed reward

0.65

0.60

0.55

0.50

0.45

0.40
1-5

6-10

Trials

Figure S.1: Species and trial effects on choices. Both species chose the larger/delayed
option more often in the first five trials of a session than in the last five trials. There is no
species by trial interaction, suggesting that both species faced similar changes in motivation
within a session.

